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I. INTRODUCTION
Writing an introduction to a symposium marking the fiftieth anniversary of 
Terry v. Ohio1 is a bit like the sad and perplexing task of delivering remarks at the 
memorial service of a troubled or otherwise notorious friend.  One feels that the 
RFFDVLRQFDOOVIRUIRFXVLQJRQVRPHEULJKWVSRWVHYHQLIRQHVKRXOG³NHHSLWUHDO´
and acknowledge the complexity²at best²RIWKHIULHQG¶VOLIH7REHVXUHTerry,
and its grant of constitutional license for police to stop and search civilians on a 
quantum of suspicion less than probable cause²what has come to be denominated 
³UHDVRQDEOH VXVSLFLRQ´²has some admirers.2 But, especially in the legal 
academy, the decision is infamously reviled. It is typically depicted at best as a 
pragmatic reconciliation of civilian and law enforcement interests that naively 
believed that police discretion could be meaningful cabined in ex-post 
GHWHUPLQDWLRQVRIZKHWKHUDTXDQWXPRIVXVSLFLRQZDV³UHDVRQDEOH´$t worst, it 
VWDQGVDVWKH:DUUHQ&RXUW¶VDEDQGRQPHQWRILWVULJKWV-protective and racial justice 
commitments in the face of increasing crime rates and adverse public response to 
Mapp and Miranda.3 And so, how to eulogize this figure with such a checkered 
life?

* Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law.  Many thanks to Ric Simmons 
for inviting me to curate this symposium, to the wonderful authors who gamely stepped up to 
contribute their wisdom, and to the editors of the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law.
1 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry 
v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 301 (2010) (defending Terry); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative 
Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1694 (1998) 
(criticizing Terry¶VSURJHQ\EXWDUJXLQJWKDWTerry LWVHOI³FRQWDLQVDVRSKLVWLFDWHGDQDO\VLVWKDWFRXOG
have led, and might yet lead, to a less limited (and less deferential) substantive reasonableness 
balancing apSURDFK DFURVV WKHERDUG´6WHSKHQ$6DOW]EXUJ7HUU\Y2KLR A Practically Perfect
Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN¶S L. REV. ³Terry¶VVWRSDQGIULVNUXOHDVGHYHORSHGRYHUWKH
past 30 years has evolved to a practically ideal approach for governing law enforcement efforts to 
deal with a range of potentially criminal conduct without unnecessarily interfering with the liberty of 
RUGLQDU\SHRSOH´
3 For a sampling of such views, see, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology,
95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1261±63 (2017) (criticizing Terry IRU³ZHLJKLQJWKHQHHGVRIWKHSROLFHRQRQH
side and the privacy interests of racial minorities and goal of race-EOLQGSROLFLQJRQWKHRWKHU´IRULWV
malleable standard of reasonableness, and for its failure to anticipate programmatic stop-and-frisk); 
Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 56 (2016) (discussing Terry¶VWZR
original sins); Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of Minority Communities,
12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 66 (2014) (making the case that Terry, in authorizing stops and frisks, 
authorized racially subordinating policing, and in turn authorized torture); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. 
Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN¶S L. REV. 1271, 
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The portrait I will advance in this brief essay is of a decision with 
transcendent aspirations that quickly found itself ill-suited to the times²Terry as a 
deceptively timeless but ultimately time-ERXQGGHFLVLRQ &KLHI -XVWLFH:DUUHQ¶V
opinion in Terry takes on some of the most vexing challenges for policing in a 
democratic society: the pathologies of street-level discretion, the challenges of ex-
post judicial oversight, the imperative of legitimacy, and the prevalence of racial 
disparity.  It self-consciously confronted many of the very dynamics that give rise 
to chief criticisms of it today.  Given this deliberateness and seeming foresight, all 
the more reason (perhaps) to lay responsibility at its feet for what, fifty years on, it 
appears to have wrought: stop-and-frisk strategies in New York City, Baltimore, 
Ferguson, and beyond that have disproportionately burdened poor and black 
individuals with intrusive police contacts (with little if any documented effect on 
crime);4 seemingly slippery slopes from reasonable-suspicion-justified traffic stops 
to fatal encounters;5 justifiable fear among immigrants that a police stop will be the 
first stop on a route to deportation.6 The Terry that purportedly aimed to find a 
³UHDVRQDEOH´ DFFRPPRGDWLRQ EHWZHHQ SROLFH priorities and individual and 
community well-being seems a truly culpable failure.
I am sympathetic to the inclination to conclude that, in Terry, the justices 
stared down the implications of expanded police discretion and the consequences 
of their decision . . . and flinched badly.  And yet, it is well to take stock of the 
degree to which the criminal justice landscape has shifted under Terry¶VIHHWRYHU
its five decades of existence.  To name just a few key transitions, substantive and 

³Terry deserves critical attention because it authorized a police practice that was being 
used to subvert the Fourth Amendment rights of blacks nationwide.  The better view of Terry is that 
the ruling reveals the WDUUHQ&RXUW¶V FDSLWXODWLRQ DQG UHWUHDW IURP LWV HDUOLHU HIIRUWV WR VHFXUH WKH
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWVRISHUVRQVVXVSHFWHGRIFULPH´Cf. William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 
ST. JOHN¶S L. REV. 1213, 1227 (1998) (assigning blame to law professors who ask Terry to do more 
than judicially enforced doctrine could ever do to regulate street-level policing).
4 See Fagan, supra note 3, at 67±84; CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP¶T OF JUSTICE,
INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016), http://www.justice.gov
/opa/file/883366/download [https://perma.cc/7G9P-Z3DT] [hereinafter BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT]; 
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP¶T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT
(2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson
_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6PL-FGTT] [hereinafter FERGUSON DOJ REPORT].  
See also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and 
Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 465 (2000) (reviewing empirical support for 
Broken Windows policing strategies and finding little).
5 See Alex Kotlowitz, Before Laquan McDonald, a Chicago Police Shooting with No Video,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/before-laquan-mcdonald-
a-chicago-police-shooting-with-no-video [https://perma.cc/G3MA-7BQL] (telling the story of the 
shooting of Calvin Cross after being stopped on sidewalk by Chicago police).
6 See Priscilla Alvarez, Will Texas’s Crackdown on Sanctuary Cities Hurt Law 
Enforcement?, ATLANTIC (June 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/texas-
sb4-immigration-enforcement/529194/ [https://perma.cc/KRJ3-YFE4] (detailing Texas law passed in 
2017 criminalizing police chiefs who prevent police from inquiring about immigration status during 
encounters with civilians).
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remedial Fourth Amendment protections have been largely hollowed out, stop-and-
frisk has been transformed from a tool in the police arsenal to a programmatic 
policing strategy systematic to policing, and the volume of the criminal justice 
system and the consequences it imposes on individuals for even brief encounters 
with it have vastly increased.  Each transformation by itself has significantly 
increased the magnitude and consequences of police discretion that was first 
blessed in Terry; in combination, the impact has been enormous. Absent these 
other shifts, disagreement with Terry¶V RXWFRPHZRXOG QRGRXEW SHUGXUH %XW ,
suspect that Terry¶VQHDU-villain status among its detractors would not.  And I am 
confident that the Terry Court cannot be blamed for misapprehending what was at 
stake in its decision.  Assigning fault to Terry for the full impact of its legacy risks 
falling into the all-too-common legal academic trap of centering the importance of 
judicial decision-making at the expense of grappling with the far messier and more 
contingent political, sociological, and institutional forces that enter the mix once 
the judicial ink is dry.
The balance of this essay aims to make this case, and in so doing to situate the 
six excellent contributions to this symposium, each of which in its own way draws 
inspiration from a piece of the changed landscape this introduction describes.  Part 
I recounts Terry¶VGHFHSWLYHO\DQGSHUKDSVGLVDSSRLQWLQJO\WLPHO\DWWULEXWHV3DUW
II briefly takes stock of the tectonic shifts in the criminal justice system that have 
transformed the stakes for police stops since Terry.  Part III closes by previewing 
the essays that follow.
II. TIMELESS TERRY
:KHQ , WHOO SHRSOH WKDW , WHDFK D VHPLQDU FDOOHG ³3ROLFLQJ WKH 3ROLFH´ WKH
typical reaction is an XWWHUDQFHRIVRPHWKLQJOLNH³+RZWLPHO\´7RWKLVUHDFWLRQ
I now have a fairly polished Policing Was Always Timely elevator pitch.  The 
unfortunate, well-meaning interlocutor gets an ear-full about the eternal tensions 
between democratic society and police authority, the intertwined legacies of racial 
oppression and policing, and historical debates about police discretion and 
oversight that are eerily resonant with contemporary concerns.
Terry v. Ohio, in which the Court first ruled on the constitutionality of the 
SROLFHSUDFWLFHWKDWZDVDOUHDG\IDPLOLDUO\NQRZQDV³VWRS-and-IULVN´LVRQHRIP\
go-WRH[KLELWVLQPDNLQJWKHFDVHWKDWWRGD\¶VFRQFHUQVDERXW³SROLFLQJWKHSROLFH´
have long preoccupied our legal system.7 The Court in Terry evinced clarity about 

7 See, e.g., Terry86DW³Reflective of the tensions involved are the practical and 
constitutional arguments pressed with great vigor on both sides of the public debate over the power of 
WKHSROLFHWRµVWRSDQGIULVN¶²as it is sometimes euphemistically termed²VXVSLFLRXVSHUVRQV´See 
also RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE MAKING 
OF THE 1960S 198±201 (2016) (discussing history of stop-and-frisk pre-Terry); Wayne R. LaFave, 
“Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 
³The practice of stop and frisk, of course, is by no means new.  It is a time-honored police 
procedure for officers to stop suspicious persons for questioning and, occasionally, to search these 
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the stakes that the case raised, and did so in terms that could comfortably be copied 
and pasted into any number of recent reports on the state of policing today.
The Court first rejected the position taken by some lower courts that had 
blessed the stopping and frisking of suspects on less than probable cause, that such 
encounters were sufficiently insignificant intrusions to fall entirely below the radar 
of the Fourth Amendment.  Chief Justice Warren wrote for eight justices:
[I]t is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public 
by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall 
ZLWKKLVKDQGVUDLVHGLVDµSHWW\LQGLJQLW\¶ It is a serious intrusion upon 
the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse 
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.8
The Court understood, moreover, that the impact of permitting the police the 
freedom to detain, without probable cause to suspect a crime has been committed, 
was not just individualistic but collective, felt at the community level.  Stop-and-
IULVNSUDFWLFHVWKUHDWHQHGWR³H[DFHUEDWHSROLFH-community tensions in the crowded 
centers of our Nation¶VFLWLHV´DQG WKH&RXUWFLWHGDW OHQJWK WKHILQGLQJVRI WKH
1967 President¶s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 
WKDW ³ILHOG LQWHUURJDWLRQV DUH D PDMRU VRXUFH RI IULFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH SROLFH DQG
PLQRULW\ JURXSV´ WKDW H[SHULHQFH URXWLQH SROLFH VWRSV IRU EHLQJ ³VXVSLFLRXV´ RU
KDYLQJD³SXUSRVH>WKDW@LVQRWUHDGLO\HYLGHQW´DQGZKLFKDSSHDUPRWLYDWHGQRWEy
OHJLWLPDWHODZHQIRUFHPHQWJRDOVEXW³E\WKHRIILFHUV¶ perceived need to maintain 
the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by 
humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police contURORIWKHVWUHHWV´9
Today in academic and policing circles it is en vogue to speak of the 
imperative of legitimacy, built on a foundation of mutual trust between law 
HQIRUFHPHQWDQGWKHFRPPXQLWLHVLQZKLFKWKH\ZRUNZLWKWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VWUXVW
earned or lost by the degree to which encounters with police are perceived as being 
even-handed and respectful²roughly, the procedural justice paradigm.10 And 

persons for dangerous weapons.  This is a distinct law enforcement technique which has 
characteristics quite different from other police practices such as arrest or search incident to arrest, 
DQGKDVORQJEHHQYLHZHGE\WKHSROLFHLQWKLVZD\´
8 Terry, 392 U.S. at 16±17.
9 Id. at 12, 14±15 n.11 (citing PRESIDENT¶S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967)).
10 See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares et. al., Lawful or Fair? How Cops and Laypeople Perceive 
Good Policing, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 297, 308±11 (2015); PRESIDENT¶S TASKFORCE ON 
21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT¶S TASKFORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING
1 (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CDX-79
ES] (³Trust between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect and serve is essential in a 
democracy.  It is key to the stability of our communities, the integrity of our criminal justice system, 
and the safe and effective delivery of policing services.  In light of recent events that have exposed 
rifts in the relationships between local police and the communities they protect and serve . . . .  
Building trust and nurturing legitimacy on both sides of the police/citizen divide is the foundational 
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while the empirical research that girds these views post-dates Terry, the intuitions 
that procedural justice research now bears out have long circulated and are on 
DPSOHGLVSOD\LQWKHWH[WRI&KLHI-XVWLFH:DUUHQ¶VRSLQLRQLQTerry.11
Moreover, as Professor Risa Goluboff reveals in her history of anti-vagrancy 
laws, the Warren Court, at the time that Terry was decided, was steeped in concern 
with the civil liberties and racial justice implications of beat-level police discretion.  
Civil rights practitioners were active as amici in the case, and while the racial 
dynamics of Terry had been erased from the reported decisions for some time prior 
WRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VLQYROYHPHQW²Terry was black, and his two companions as 
well as the officer who stopped the three were white²the NAACP amicus brief 
IRFXVHG WKH &RXUW¶V DWWHQWLRQ RQ WKH GHJUHH WR ZKLFK SROLFH YLHZHG EODck
individuals, and even more so mixed-race groups of individuals, as inherently 
suspicious.12 Professor Wayne LaFave, writing shortly after Terry, also viewed the 
Court as having heard in argument the central concerns of opponents of stop-and-
IULVN³WKDWpolice often have utilized street encounters for improper purposes such 
as the wholesale harassment of certain elements of the community, usually 
PLQRULW\JURXSVDQG1HJURHVLQSDUWLFXODU´13
And yet, the Court was ultimately persuaded that countervailing concerns 
militated against an abolitionist position toward stop-and-frisk.  The interest of the 
JRYHUQPHQWLQ³HIIHFWLYHFULPHSUHYHQWLRQDQGGHWHFWLRQ´ plus WKHLQWHUHVWRI³WKH
police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is 
dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used 
DJDLQVWKLP´ balanced against what the Court viewed as a lesser civilian interest in 
being free of a seizure consisting of questioning and pat-down rather than a full-
blown arrest, led the Court to conclude that the traditional requirement of probable 
cause required for arrest was too exacting in such situations.14 And reasonable 
suspicion was born.  The Court took this conciliatory course in the face of 

principle underlying the nature of relations between law enforcement agencies and the communities 
WKH\ VHUYH´ POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, LEGITIMACY AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A NEW 
ELEMENT OF POLICE LEADERSHIP 2 (2014), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_
Documents/Leadership/legitimacy%20and%20procedural%20justice%20-%20a%20new%20element
%20of%20police%20leadership.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8AF-VMDE].
11 Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at A Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies 
and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 341 (2011) (tracing 
HQGXULQJ FRQFHUQ ZLWK SROLFH ³OHJLWLPDF\´ YDULRXVO\ FRQFHLYHG RYHU VHFRQG KDOI RI WZHQWLHWK
century); Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy 
of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 111 (2005) ³7KHVRFLDOVFLHQFHRIFULPLQDOMXVWLFH
V\VWHP OHJLWLPDF\ GRYHWDLOV QLFHO\ZLWK WKH RULJLQV RI WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V FRQVWLWXWLRQDO FULPLQDO
SURFHGXUHGRFWULQH$TXLFNUHYLHZRIWKHHDUO\FDVHVUHYHDOVWKH&RXUW¶VSUHRFFXSDWLRQZLWKSXEOLF
perceptions of WKHIDLUQHVVRIMXGLFLDOSURFHHGLQJV´
12 See GOLUBOFF, supra note 7, at 201±20.  See also Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 43±44, Sibron v. New York, 392 
U.S. 40 (1968).
13 LaFave, supra note 7, at 59.
14 Terry, 392 U.S. at 22±23, 30.
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prescient warning from the NAACP, through the pen of Anthony Amsterdam, that 
WKHUHDVRQDEOHVXVSLFLRQVWDQGDUG³>K@owever intellectually reasonable . . . in the 
corridors of academe, . . . is a delusive and unworkable proposition on the streets 
of our cities, and particularly on the streets of our ghettos where stop-frisk logic 
GRHVLWVGDLO\ZRUN´D³PHUHILQHVFKRODVWLFSUHWH[W>@IRURSSUHVVLRQ´15
To be sure, there is historical evidence that the Court struggled with this 
resolution, and the majority opinion declaimed any intention to sanction a standard 
lower than probable cause to detain as opposed to frisking after a proper detention: 
7KH &KLHI -XVWLFH ZURWH ³:H    GHFLGH QRWKLQJ WRGD\ FRQFHUQLQJ WKH
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURSULHW\RIDQLQYHVWLJDWLYHµVHL]XUH¶XSRQOHVVWhan probable cause 
IRUSXUSRVHVRIµGHWHQWLRQ¶DQGRULQWHUURJDWLRQ´16 %XWWKHEDODQFHRIWKH&RXUW¶V
opinion might still be blamed for being ambiguous in this regard, an ambiguity that 
was quickly construed by law enforcement in its own favor, and which the Court 
papered over in Adams v. Williams when it declared that Terry had indeed stood 
for the proposition that brief detentions need only be reasonable.17
For those who share today the concerns aired fifty years ago in Anthony 
$PVWHUGDP¶V EULHI WR WKH&Rurt, the result in Terry is maddening²maddeningly 
dense, to use a contemporary term.  And yet it is well to reflect on the degree of 
hindsight bias that might be coloring an overly dim view of Terry.  I wish here not 
to enter a final verdict on whether the Court in Terry did the best, or the worst, that 
it could have done, but instead to posit this: Assume the justices in Terry knew 
they might get it wrong, and calculated the costs of doing so; how high would 
those costs have been?  The next Part argues that in the fifty years since Terry 
those costs have skyrocketed in ways the Court almost certainly did not, and could 
not, have anticipated.
III. TIME-BOUND TERRY
I want here to reflect briefly on just three ways in which the landscape of 
policing and criminal justice has shifted since 1968, in ways that bear directly on 
the implications of Terry¶VOLFHQVHWRVWRS-and-frisk: the erosion of substantive and 
remedial Fourth Amendment doctrine, the rise of programmatic stop-and-frisk, and 
the expanded volume of the criminal justice system and the consequences it 

15 Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., supra note 12, at 34.
16 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16; GOLUBOFF, supra note 7, at 209±12; Earl C. Dudley, Jr., 
Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST.
JOHN¶S L. REV.    ³7KH PDMRULW\ RSLQLRQV LQ Terry, Sibron, and Peters carefully 
refrained from approving²LQGHHG WKH\FLUFXPDPEXODWHG5RELQ+RRG¶VEDUQ WRDYRLGDSSURYLQJ²
what haYH EHFRPH NQRZQ XQLYHUVDOO\ DV µTerry VWRSV¶  $QG QRZKHUH LQ &KLHI -XVWLFH:DUUHQ¶V
RSLQLRQ ZLOO \RX ILQG WKH ZRUGV µUHDVRQDEOH VXVSLFLRQ¶ WKDW KDYH FRPH WR H[HPSOLI\ WKH Terry
standard.  Instead, the opinion carefully employs and adapts the language of Brinegar v. United 
States, the classical statement of the probable cause standard, while recognizing that officers may 
FRQGXFWSURWHFWLYHVHDUFKHVZKHQSRVVHVVHGRIDOHVVHUTXDQWXPRILQIRUPDWLRQ´
17 See GOLUBOFF, supra note 7, at 214.
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imposes on individuals for even brief police encounters.  These shifts have been 
amply documented elsewhere, and indeed several essays in this symposium take up 
pieces of each.  The point here is not to be novel or thorough in identifying 
contemporary trends in criminal justice, but rather to invite us to reflect on how 
very out-of-place Terry would feel in present times.
A. Doctrinal Shift
First, consider the shape of current Fourth Amendment doctrine in contrast to 
what existed at the time of Terry, including the migration and arguable declawing 
of free-standing reasonableness, rather than probable cause, to a range of policing 
contexts.  In 2017, the reasonableness standard has come to bless a range of now-
regular police-civilian contacts that would have been far less frequent under a 
probable cause standard: (1) brief seizures based on a belief that a crime is 
currently being or had been committed in the past, (2) generalized patrols in the 
border area, (3) seizures of vehicles anywhere, (4) removal of drivers and 
passengers from seized vehicles, (5) the seizure of narcotics and other non-
threatening contraband found during a Terry pat-down . . . the list of encounters 
goes on.18 As Professor Craig LerQHU KDV ZULWWHQ ³WKH EDODQFLQJ DSSURDFK
sanctioned by the Terry Court . . . would quickly prove imperialistic, colonizing 
YDVWUHDFKHVRISROLFHDFWLYLW\´19
In the course of this colonizing project, the list of permissible bases for 
forming reasonable suspicion consistently expanded, and the capacity for the 
Fourth Amendment to scrutinize ill-motivated policing contracted. Moreover, this 
occurred through decisions that lacked resonance with Terry¶V FRQFHUQV DERXW
racially disparate policing and call for cRXUWV WR ³UHWDLQ WKHLU WUDGLWLRQDO
responsibility to guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, 
or which trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary 
MXVWLILFDWLRQ ZKLFK WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ UHTXLUHV´20 Thus, in United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, the Court blessed reliance on race in deciding whether to stop 
vehicles near the border, and in Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court blessed police 

18 See Navarette Y &DOLIRUQLD  6 &W    ³The Fourth Amendment 
permits brief investigative stops²such as the traffic stop in this case²when a law enforcement 
officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of 
FULPLQDO DFWLYLW\´ LQWHUQDO TXRWDWLRQ RPLWWHG FLWLQJ Terry); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 
(1997) (removal of passengers without individualized suspicion); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 
366 (1993) (seizure of non-threatening contraband found during proper frisk); United States v. 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (reasonableness rather than probable cause governs detention of 
individual on suspicion of prior completed felony); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109±10
(1977) (Terry balancing used to uphold police discretion to order drivers out of their cars in course of 
a legal stop); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) (Terry balancing for random 
patrols in border region).
19 Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 999 (2003).
20 Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.  For more extended analysis making a similar point see generally 
Fagan, supra note 3; Carol S. Steiker, Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L.J. 329 (2013).
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UHOLDQFHRQSUHVHQFHLQD³KLJKFULPHDUHD´WRWUDQVIRUPRWKHUZLVHQRQ-suspicious 
behaviors into a basis for a stop.21 Unsurprisingly, litigation around contemporary 
stop-and-frisk practices has demonstrated that this is a primary basis for police 
justifying enormously high (and not enormously fruitful) numbers of stops in 
urban minority neighborhoods.22 And Whren v. United States took courts out of 
the business of scrutinizing police motivation via the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness standard, rejecting the claim of the black petitioners in the case that 
D YHKLFOH VWRS ZRXOG EH ³XQUHDVRQDEOH´ LI SXUSRUWHGO\ EDVHG RQ YLRODWLRQ RI D
rarely enforced traffic law but actually based on the UDFH RI WKH YHKLFOH¶V
occupants.  Such concerns, the Court held, are the concern only of the Equal 
Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.23
Moreover, whatever work the Fourth Amendment might do to check police 
who run afoul of even a rule of reasonableness has been limited by Fourth 
Amendment remedial contraction over the last fifty years.24 Just a year after Terry,
Warren Burger would ascend to the position of Chief Justice, and would bring with 
him his announced agenda of rolling back the exclusionary rule, among other 
Warren Court criminal procedure rights.25 The Court has untethered the remedy 
IURP WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ IDVKLRQHG D UDQJH RI ³JRRG IDLWK´ DQG ³DWWHQXDWLRQ´
H[FHSWLRQV WR LW DQG DQQRXQFHG UHFHQWO\ WKDW RQO\ ³JURVV´ RU ³V\VWHPLF´
negligence could trigger exclusion.26 Erosion of the exclusionary rule reached its 
apex most recently in Utah v. Strieff, in which the Court declined to suppress 
evidence where an individual was stopped without reasonable suspicion, but who 
ZDV GLVFRYHUHG E\ WKDW VWRS WR KDYH DQ DUUHVW ZDUUDQW WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V ZDUUDQW
³DWWHQXDWHG´ WKH XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO FRQGXFW WKDW SUHFHGHG LWV GLVFRYHU\27 Justice 
6RWRPD\RU¶V IXOO-throated dissent, wielding data showing enormous numbers of 
outstanding warrants for low-OHYHORIIHQVHVDQG³how these astounding numbers of 
ZDUUDQWV FDQEHXVHGE\SROLFH WR VWRSSHRSOHZLWKRXW FDXVH´GHPRQVWUDWHGKRZ
ineffective the contemporary exclusionary rule will be in checking the 
³KDUDVVPHQW´ZLWKZKLFKTerry expressed concern.28
Of course, the Terry Court had squarely before it arguments that a reasonable 
suspicion standard would ultimately be toothless in the hands of police and lower 

21 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 
563±64 (1976).
22 See Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry 
Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 68±88 (2015).
23 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
24 See generally Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? 
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996).
25 See Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 690±94 (2011) (describing history).
26 Id. at 691±710, 725±39 (tracing this path).
27 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
28 Id. at 2068±69 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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courts, and perhaps the Court was naïve to suggest (and believe) the contrary.29 So 
too did Terry expressly contemplate the limits of the exclusionary rule to police the 
deleterious consequences of police stops, since only the (likely) small percentage 
of them that might lead to criminal charges could even plausibly be the subject of a 
suppression motion.30 But it would have been nigh impossible for the Court in 
1968 to anticipate the degree to which mere reasonableness would come to 
“coloniz[e]” policing,31 or to envision that what little work the exclusionary rule 
might have done in a reasonable suspicion regime would be significantly 
diminished under those regimes and the Roberts Court to follow.
B. Programmatic Stop-and-Frisk
As the Supreme Court has done that deconstructive work, and undoubtedly 
because of it, policing professionals have transformed stop-and-frisk from a useful 
but serially deployed tactic to a wholesale strategy.  Prior to Terry, law 
enforcement understood its relationship to crime prevention as mediated by two 
functions: deterrence, achieved by enforcement and walking the beat, and 
incapacitation, achieved by investigation and arrest.  The 1960s and 1970s saw a 
shift in this view, prompted in part by introspection as law enforcement was 
swamped by increased crime rates of that era.  Innovators in the field began to 
propose, experiment with, and document some success with new models of 
policing that shared commitments to command-level strategic goals achieved, at 
least in part, through mandated patrol-level contact with civilians; community 
policing, hot-spot policing, and Broken Windows policing are all examples that 
share these attributes.32 These new approaches to policing also shared, to greater 
and lesser extents, reliance on the legal authority that Terry granted to detain 
individuals without probable cause to arrest.
But absorbing the Terry stop into a policing strategy was transformative.  As 
Tracey Meares has observed, “stop-and-frisk under this approach is not simply a 
tool on the officer’s belt to be used when the situation is right, such as intervening 
in a crime in progress, which was the factual scenario presented in Terry,” but 
rather is a “program” whereby “good policing is articulated from the top down 
throughout the entire agency to include aggressive, systematic, ‘legalistic’ field 
interrogations designed to suppress crime.”33 And as Meares and others have 
argued, it is the programmatic nature of contemporary stop-and-frisk that is most 
                                                                                                                                                   
29 Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.  See also Dudley, supra note 16, at 897 (suggesting as much).
30 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 13–14.
31 Lerner, supra note 19, at 999.
32 See Anthony A. Braga, Crime and Policing Revisited, NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING 
BULLETIN 3–8 (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248888.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B2D-
PA79]; Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 422–40 (2000).
33 Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-
Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 168–69 (2015).
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proximately responsible for the most pathological manifestations of the practice.  
In New York City, which until recently hewed to an aggressive stop-and-frisk 
policing strategy, stops effected by the New York City Police Department rose 
from fewer than 100,000 in 2003 to more than 685,000 in 2011²an increase that 
seems unthinkable without the coordinated, command-level commitment that in 
fact existed.34 A perhaps more striking example can be seen in the City of 
Baltimore, where the Department of Justice found that from 2010 to 2014 police 
³OLNHO\PDNHVHYHUDl hundred thousand pedestrian stops per year in a city with only 
UHVLGHQWV´²an outcome that the DOJ attributed directly to an aggressive 
order-maintenance policing strategy.35
Moreover, programmatic stop-and-frisk significantly enhances the risk that
any individual encounter will lack the quantum of suspicion that Terry envisioned, 
and will disproportionately impact communities of color.  As Professor Jeff Fagan 
and Amanda Geller demonstrate, the inherently vague reasonableness standard, 
refracted through institutionalized practices and productivity pressures, produce 
³VFULSWV´RIVXVSLFLRQWKDWLQUHDOLW\MXVWLI\VWRSV WKURXJKSRVW-hoc rationalization 
rather than ex-post formation of individualized suspicion.36 And as the 
Department of Justice documented in its Baltimore investigation, black residents of 
Baltimore were disproportionately stopped and frisked, frequently without 
UHDVRQDEOHVXVSLFLRQDVDGLUHFWUHVXOWRIWKHSROLFHGHSDUWPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQWRWDUJHW
enforcement in predominately poor, black neighborhoods.37
To be sure, the costs to individuals and communities of programmatic stop-
and-frisk are not different in kind than the pathologies about which the NAACP, 
and others, warned the Terry Court.  But the magnitude is categorically different, 
and the capacity for retail assessment of officer compliance with the Terry standard 
to meaningfully check those pathologies is substantially lower.
C. Criminal Justice Explosion
Finally, as the Fourth Amendment has permitted more police encounters on 
reasonable suspicion (or less, in the case of exceptions to the exclusionary rule), 
and as stop-and-frisk evolved into a programmatic, logic-unto-itself policing 
SDUDGLJPWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVKDVEHFRPHWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWLQFDUFHUDWRUE\VHYHUDO
orders of magnitude.  Its prison population has grown seven-fold, and its state jail 
population has grown comparably; in 2011, thirteen million people entered state 

34 See Fagan & Geller, supra note 22, at 62.  Programmatic stop-and-frisk is not limited to 
New York City, or even to large urban jurisdictions.  See, e.g., David Abrams, The Law and 
Economics of Stop-and-Frisk, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 371±72 (2014) (documenting cities where 
stop-and-frisk practices are subject to litigation challenges); FERGUSON DOJ REPORT, supra note 4, at 
15 (describing systemic pressures to conduct stops in the absence of reasonable suspicion).
35 BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT, supra note 4, at 24±26.
36 Fagan & Geller, supra note 22, at 86±87.
37 BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT, supra note 4, at 47±62.
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jails.38 Terry has played a direct role in this churn by widening the mouth of the 
funnel by which individuals enter the criminal justice system.  But the size of that 
funnel would have been unimaginable to the Court in 1968.
In 2017PRVWREVHUYHUVRISROLFLQJXQGHUVWDQG³UHDVRQDEOHVXVSLFLRQ´VWRSV
and searches in the traffic context, and at the border to be a significant tool of the 
War on Drugs, a phenomenon still ten years in the making at the time of Terry.39
As the National Research Council found in its report on drivers of mass 
incarceration in the United States, the arrest rate for drug use and possession 
increased by 89 percent between 1980 and 1989, and by 2009 was double the rate 
of 1980.40 The shift to prioritization of drug arrests, greased by Terry stops, also 
had the effect of magnifying racially disparate enforcement.  Again drawing on 
National Research Council findings, since the 1980s drug-related arrests for black 
individuals have ranged from three- to four-times higher than such arrests for white 
individuals²despite consistent data showing comparable use and sales habits 
among the two populations.41 And beyond the confines of drug crimes, it is 
generally true today that arrests are more likely to lead to imprisonment,42 and 
more likely to be converted to felonies rather than less serious charges²a finding 
that Professor John Pfaff has argued is key to understanding what has driven the 
increase in U.S. incarceration rates since the 1970s.43
6RWRRDUHWKH³FROODWHUDO´FRQVHTXHQFHVRIVWRSVDQGDUUHVWVYDVWHUE\IDUWKDQ
in 1968.  Professor Issa Kohler-+DXVPDQ¶VUHVHDUFKKDVKLJKOLJKWHGDFULWLFDO and 
quite contemporary consequence of stops alone, at least in jurisdictions practicing 
programmatic stop-and-frisk in the style of New York City: the record.  She 
emphasizes that stops were partly a pathway to arrest, but were more commonly 
part of a strDWHJ\ ³to increase overall collection of information about people 
HQFRXQWHUHGRQWKHVWUHHW´DQGWRHQVXUHWKDWSURVHFXWRUVFRXUWVDQGRWKHUDFWRUV
GRZQ WKH OLQH ³KDG DFFHVV WR LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKH IUHTXHQF\ DQG QDWXUH RI DQ
LQGLYLGXDO¶V ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW FRQWDFWV´44 6WRSSHG LQGLYLGXDOV DUH ³PDUN>HG@´
identified for differential, perhaps harsher, treatment in future cases.45
7KH³PDUN´LVHYHQGHHSHUIRUWKRVHZKRVHVWRSVFXOPLQDWHLQDUUHVWDQG\HW
deeper for individuals who are convicted²even of minor infractions.  Criminal 

38 NAT¶L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 34±40 (Jeremy Travis et al., eds., 2014).
39 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Mae C. Quinn, Terry, Race, and Judicial Integrity: The 
Court and Suppression During the War on Drugs, 72 ST. JOHN¶S L. REV. 1323, 1324 (1998).
40 NAT¶L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 49±50.
41 Id. at 60±61.
42 Id. at 51.
43 See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 71±74 (2017).
44 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV.
611, 639 (2014).
45 Id. at 643±48.
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records in the digital age create far greater barriers to opportunity²in 
employment, education, and other sectors²than in the paper era of 1968.46 The 
array of additional collateral consequences that today accompany criminal 
convictions even for minor offenses, and that exacerbate the societal estrangement 
experienced by those with even low-level contact with the criminal justice 
system²payment of substantial court fees, loss of public benefits, deportation, and 
so forth²were also largely unknown to the criminal justice system of 1968.47
D. Conclusion
One can take the view that Terry possesses flaws of imagination and 
execution.  But imagine Terry without each of these changes, to say nothing of all 
of them in combination, and its flaws are far less consequential.  In laying too 
much blame at the feet of Terry itself, we risk missing important lessons in how 
difficult the consequences of legal decision-making are to predict, and how 
dependent those consequences are on legal, sociological, political, and institutional 
forces that are beyond the control, and frequently below the radar screen, of 
judicial actors.
IV. THE WISDOM THAT FOLLOWS
Terry¶VFRQWHPSRUDU\PDQLIHVWDWLRQVVXSSO\WKHLQVSLUDWLRQIRUHDFKRIWKHVL[
fine essays that cRPSULVHWKLVV\PSRVLXP7KHDXWKRUV¶YRLFHVDUHGLYHUVHLQWRSLF
and methodology, but they share a sense that Terry ERWKUHVKDSHGWKHODZ¶VWHUPV
of engagement with policing, and was itself altered by the new contexts in which 
the stops and frisks that it blessed were deployed.
3URIHVVRU 6HWK 6WRXJKWRQ¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ 7HUU\ Y 2KLR and the 
(Un)Forgettable Frisk,48 fuses scholarly insight with personal history to ruminate 
on the phenomenon of the frisk.  Drawing on his former life as a patrol officer with 
the Tallahassee Police Department, Stoughton recounts his memories, or lack 
WKHUHRIRI³WKHIULVN´&XULRXVO\GHVSLWHFOHDUDQGSDUWLFXODUL]HGUHFROOHFWLRQVRI
stops, arrests, and other interactions with civilians, and despite the fact that Terry 
suggests that the decision to frisk should be deliberate and justifiable, not a specific 
VLQJOHIULVNUHJLVWHUVLQ6WRXJKWRQ¶VPHPRU\7KHUHDVRQ6WRXJKWRQRIIHUVIRUWKLV

46 Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1113 
(2015); Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Opinion, Paying a Price, Long After a Crime, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/opinion/paying-a-price-long-after-the-
crime.html [https://perma.cc/MZM8-Q28A].
47 See ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE 
POOR 23±25 (2016); Natapoff, supra note 46, at 1089±94 (2015); Michael Pinard, Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
457, 489±94 (2010).
48 Seth W. Stoughton, Terry v. Ohio and the (Un)Forgettable Frisk, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19
(2017). 
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seeming irony is that, from his perspective as an officer, the frisk was so utterly 
routine that it triggered nary a cognitive blip.  Nevertheless, Stoughton can, and 
does, recount how he was trained to frisk in police academy drills²drills that 
taught pat-down tactics and inculcated a healthy fear and respect for the canniness 
of criminals who DWWHPSWWRVHFUHWHZHDSRQV6WRXJKWRQ¶VGHWDLOHGDFFRXQWRIWKH
frisk²or what the frisk must have been²illustrates that however unforgettable the 
process was for him, the target of the frisk would undoubtedly recall the 
experience.
In the course of his powerfully honest and reflective narrative, Stoughton 
points to three important truths about Terry and policing in its shadow.  First, and 
as Professor Stoughton has developed elsewhere, police training, tactics, and 
culture largely traffics in a siege mentality, a hyper-vigilance toward potential 
threat²an attitude that renders the frisk an inevitable by-product of a stop.49
Second, it follows that Terry¶VGLUHFWLRQWKDWIULVNVVKRXOGRFFXURQO\ZKHUHWKHUH
exist particularized indicia that the suspect is armed is largely toothless; whatever 
friction the reasonable suspicion standard might create in the decision to stop a 
VXVSHFW RQ 6WRXJKWRQ¶V DFFRXQW WKH IULVN IORZV DOPRVW XQFRQVFLRXVO\  )LQDOO\
Stoughton hones in on the gulf between the experiences of policing, on the one 
hand, and of being policed, on the other.  However much Terry hoped to 
DPHOLRUDWHD³PDMRUVRXUFHRIIULFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHSROLFHDQGPLQRULW\JURXSV´50
the persistence (and perhaps widening) of that gulf confirms that judicial oversight
of day-to-day beat policing is unlikely to accomplish the task.
Another symposium contributor offers a view from the Terry trenches²but 
IURPWKHEHQFKQRWWKHEHDW-XGJH6KLUD6FKHLQGOLQ¶VHVVD\A Chance to Reflect: 
Thoughts from the Author of Floyd v. City of New York,51 offers perspective on 
Terry¶V OHJDF\ IRUJHG LQ WKH UHPDUNDEOH FLUFXPVWDQFHV RI DGMXGLFDWLQJ WKH
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\RIWKH1HZ<RUN3ROLFH'HSDUWPHQW¶VVWRS-and-frisk program, as 
well as the more quotidian judicial circumstances of deciding work-a-day 
VXSSUHVVLRQPRWLRQV-XGJH6FKHLQGOLQ¶VELUG¶s-eye view of the effectiveness and 
impact of programmatic stop-and-frisk, gained as the federal judge in the Southern 
District of New York who oversaw multiple rounds of constitutional litigation over 
WKH1<3'¶VSURJUDP52 is sobering: She recounts that data developed in the Floyd 
litigation revealed that from 2004 to 2012 the NYPD made four million stops, of 
which 80% of the stopped individuals were African American or Hispanic; 90% of 
NYPD stops from 2004 to 2012 resulted in no further law enforcement action, and 

49 See generally Seth Stoughton, Law Enforcement’s “Warrior” Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV.
FORUM 225 (2015).
50 Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11.
51 Shira A. Scheindlin, A Chance to Reflect: Thoughts from the Author of Floyd v. City of 
New York, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 35 (2017).
52 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Ligon v. City 
of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 483±84 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Daniels v. City of New York, 198 
F.R.D. 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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that of the 52% of stopped individuals who were frisked, only 1.5% had a weapon.  
Neither the volume of the program nor the constitutional risks it ran were 
accidental: Internal NYPD forms guided officers to vague and standardless bases 
IRUVWRSVVXFKDV³IXULWLYHPRYHPHQWV´1<3'FRPPDQGHUVGLVSDWFKHGRIILFHUVWR
majority-PLQRULW\QHLJKERUKRRGVDQGWRVWRS³WKHULJKWSHRSOHDW WKHULJKWWLPH´
precincts worked under stop quotas driven by a command philosophy that more 
stops would drive down crime, and data on the racial impacts of the program were 
QRWLQWHUQDOO\DQDO\]HGRUDFWHGXSRQ%XWHTXDOO\VREHULQJDUH-XGJH6FKHLQGOLQ¶V
reflections on the inherent limits of the Terry reasonable suspicion standard²even 
LQWKHDEVHQFHRIWKHV\VWHPLFSUHVVXUHVRIWKH1<3'$VWDQGDUGRI³UHDVRQDEOH
VXVSLFLRQ´ GRHV OLWWOH WR JXLGH RIILFHUV LQ WKH PRPHQW DQG HYHQ OHVV WR FKHFN
conscious or implicit racial bias that can infect threat assessment.  And judges 
assessing officers ex post are, Judge Scheindlin asserts, under tacit and sometimes 
explicit pressure to avoid second-guessing the judgment, or questioning the 
credibility, of officers on the street.  Stop-and-frisk, whether programmatic or 
intermLWWHQW LV RQ -XGJH 6FKHLQGOLQ¶V DFFRXQW EHUHIW RI PHDQLQJIXO OHJDO
oversight.
Judge Scheindlin lays blame for all of this at the feet of Terry itself.  The 
failure of the Court in Terry, or its consolidated companion decisions, Sibron v. 
New York and Peters v. New York,53 to put meat on the bones of the standard of 
³UHDVRQDEOHQHVV´ SDYHG WKH ZD\ IRU WKDW PHDW WR EH VXSSOLHG E\ RIILFHUV
themselves, or by the police profession as it developed stop-and-frisk policing 
strategies.  And yet, despite Terry¶V ZHDNnesses, Judge Scheindlin confesses to 
uncertainty about the alternatives: What, Judge Scheindlin asks, should replace it?  
Perhaps, she suggests, those who share her dim view of what Terry has wrought 
are better casting their lots not with reform of legal doctrine, but rather with policy 
solutions²body worn cameras, adoption of community policing, and other 
strategies and tactics that can both mitigate Terry¶VZHDNQHVVHVDQGUHGXFHSROLFH
leveraging of the broad discretion the decision handed to the profession.
Professor Rachel Harmon and Andrew Manns also take up Terry¶VOHJDF\LQ
contemporary stop-and-frisk policing strategies, and their analysis is greatly 
informed by the experience of the Floyd litigation.54 But their essay, Proactive 
Policing and the Legacy of Terry, scopes out from any particular manifestation of a 
stop-and-frisk program to assess the role that Terry and constitutional doctrine in 
general can, and cannot, play in oversight of the style of policing that Terry gave 
birth to.  Harmon and Manns cast a historical net to tie Terry to the rise in the 
V DQG V RI ³SURDFWLYH SROLFLQJ´ VWUDWHJLHV²a range of policing 
approaches that collectively embody a remaking of the police-officer-as-responder 
into the police-officer-as-entrepreneur, whose job is to actively prevent, rather than 
react to, criminal activity²whether for the end of crime prevention per se, or for 

53 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
54 Rachel A. Harmon & Andrew Manns, Proactive Policing and the Legacy of Terry, 15 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 49 (2017). 
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the end of controlling certain populations. The array of proactive policing 
strategies also share a reliance on police discretion to stop (and frisk) as a means of 
achieving those goals, and hence the rise of proactive policing also means the rise 
oI ³SURJUDPPDWLF´ VWRS-and-frisk.  IQ OLNHQLQJ WKDW VWUDWHJ\ WR GHSOR\PHQW RI ³a
GLIIXVH ZHDSRQ OLNH D IRUP RI WHDU JDV´55 Harmon and Manns show their 
normative hands.
And yet, Harmon and Manns urge, even those who view programmatic stop-
and-frisk strategies as harmful or ineffective must face the fact that they are, at 
least in some manifestations, probably constitutional.  They reach this provocative 
conclusion (parting company with a number of scholars56) largely because they 
view the constitutional bar as so unfortunately low: Terry permits so much, and for 
those concerned with the racially disparate effects of these policing strategies, the 
Equal Protection CODXVHIRUELGVVROLWWOH0RUHRYHUHFKRLQJ+DUPRQ¶VSULRUZRUN
on the inherent limits of constitutional criminal procedure as an oversight tool, 
they argue that tweaking constitutional doctrine to change that analysis will still 
not solve the problem.57 And yet, like Judge Scheindlin, Harmon and Manns 
XOWLPDWHO\ILQGUHDVRQIRUKRSHWKDWSURDFWLYHSROLFLQJ¶VGHOHWHULRXVHIIHFWVPLJKW
be reined in, and hope that legal doctrine might have some role, albeit only a 
partial one.  Taking inspiration from Floyd, and pointing to politically driven 
reforms of the NYPD that were spurred in part by that litigation, they cautiously 
embrace the potential for constitutional litigation to work in tandem with political 
reform efforts to police proactLYHSROLFLQJ¶VSRWHQWLDOSDWKRORJLHV
Professor L. Song Richardson is more skeptical of the prospect of taming or 
reforming what she views as a direct and insidious consequence of Terry²its 
provision of legal cover for racially disparate policing²in Implicit Racial Bias and 
Racial Anxiety: Implications for Stops and Frisks.58 Continuing the trajectory of 
her pioneering work applying lessons of social psychology to understand policing 
and the blind spots of Fourth Amendment doctrine,59 Professor Richardson argues 
that the Terry &RXUW¶VSURMHFWRIKHDOLQJULIWVEHWZHHQSROLFHDQGFRPPXQLWLHVRI
color was doomed at the start for reasons baked, subconsciously, into the psyches 
of officers and the civilians with whom they interact.  Two aspects of these 
unconscious psychological processes that have been experimentally documented 
are of particular concern here to Richardson: one, the operation of implicit racial 
bias that, research has demonstrated, causes individuals to unconsciously link 

55 Id. at 65. 
56 See, e.g., Meares, supra note 33.
57 See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 763 (2012).
58 L. Song Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and Racial Anxiety: Implications for Stops and 
Frisks, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73 (2017).
59 See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons from Social Psychology, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2962 (2015); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth 
Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1144 (2012); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2040 (2011).
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black individuals with criminality and white individuals with innocence; and two, 
the existence of racial anxiety, which causes white individuals to anticipate that 
they will be perceived as racist by black individuals, and black individuals to 
anticipate that they will be treated in a racially unjust manner by white individuals.  
The combination of these processes, Richardson argues, creates police-civilian 
interactions that often are initiated based on implicitly racially biased hunches, and 
spiral deeper into often misperceived and misdirected hostility because of the 
psychological and physical manifestations of racial anxiety that both officer and 
civilian exhibit²³DIHHGEDFNORRS´DVVKHGXEVLWRIVXVSLFLRQDQGPLVWUXVW60
+HQFHRQ5LFKDUGVRQ¶VDFFRXQWWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWWKH Terry Court aimed to 
balance two competing concerns²that police have an opportunity to prevent crime 
in street interactions, and that civilians not experience harassment and an erosion 
of trust in the police²the reasonable suspicion standard that emerged failed both 
aims.  And in contrast to Harmon and Manns, Richardson suggests little hope for 
reforming the practice of stopping and frisking on reasonable suspicion.  Rather, 
she concludes, the degree to which racial biases inevitably infect stops and frisks
counsels no less than abolition of the practice.
Skepticism that the courts will rein in the expanding discretion that Terry¶V
SURJHQ\ DIIRUG SROLFH DOVR DQLPDWHV 3URIHVVRU 7RQMD -DFREL¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ The 
Future of Terry in the Car Context.61 Jacobi trains her twin lenses of law and 
political science on one context in which the breadth of police discretion to seize 
on less than probable cause has expanded beyond what the Terry Court could 
likely have envisioned: traffic stops.  In a close analysis of the &RXUW¶VPRVWUHFHQW
significant move in that direction, Navarette v. California, Jacobi makes the case 
that the trajectory of reasonable suspicion in the car context is and will continue to 
be²for the foreseeable future²toward greater police authority to act on a lower 
quantum of suspicion.  In Navarette itself, this pull led a majority of five justices, 
including opinion author Justice Thomas, to permit a car stop based on an 
anonymous tip stating that a vehicle matching that driven by the petitioner had run 
another car off the road at a specified highway location.  This result, Jacobi argues, 
ZDVQRWFRPSHOOHGE\ WKH&RXUW¶VSUHFHGHQWV <HW MXGLFLDOSROLWLFVDQG LGHRORJ\
also provide unconvincing explanations: Justice Thomas, currently perhaps the 
&RXUW¶s most conservative justice, was joined in the majority by Justice Breyer, 
RQHRI WKH&RXUW¶VPRVW OLEHUDO-XVWLFH6FDOLDSHUKDSV WKHUHLJQLQJFRQVHUYDWLYH
before his death, dissented with liberals Ginsberg, Kagan, and Sotomayor.
Drawing on her prior empirical work on judicial decision-making,62 Jacobi 
offers a different explanation: methodology.  Navarette, she demonstrates, was a 
YLFWRU\IRUWKH&RXUW¶VPRVWUHOLDEOHpragmatist MXVWLFHVDQGDORVVIRUWKH&RXUW¶V
formalists.  Moreover, Jacobi argues, cases concerning reasonable suspicion in the 

60 Richardson, supra note 58, at 88. 
61 Tonja Jacobi, The Future of Terry in the Car Context, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 89 (2017). 
62 See Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme Court, 57 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1671 (2016).
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car context are uniquely likely to activate pragmatist concerns, and to unify those 
justices who are most inclined to decide cases based on practical concerns about 
hamstringing the police.  The justices accurately perceive, she concedes, that 
police face special hurdles in developing probable cause when a suspect is in a 
vehicle.  Their concerns were HYLGHQFHGE\WKHSUDJPDWLVWV¶SUHRFFXSDWLRQGXULQJ
the Navarette oral argument with the hypothetical anonymous tip of an atomic 
bomb in a vehicle, speeding toward Los Angeles: Must the police wait until the car 
smokes to approach it?  Formalism, Jacobi argues, cannot cut through these 
FRQFHUQV 6FDOLD¶V ]LQJHU DW RUDO DUJXPHQW ³/HW WKH FDU JR  %\H-bye, Los 
$QJHOHV´did not bring pragmatists into his coalition.63 And so, Jacobi offers two 
specific strategic prescriptions for litigants who hope in the future for a result 
different from Navarette: hope for the appointment of more formalist justices, or 
craft your argumeQWVWRDWWHQGWRWKHSUDJPDWLVWFRQFHUQVWKDWDQLPDWHWKH&RXUW¶V
current majority.
Illumination and critique of analytical methodology is also the starting point 
IRU 3URIHVVRU $OH[DQGUD 1DWDSRII¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ A Stop is Just a Stop: Terry’s 
Formalism.64 1DWDSRII¶VPHWKRGRORJLFDOLQVLJKWLVWKDWZKLOHWKHTerry opinion is 
RIWHQKHOGXSE\VFKRODUVDVDSDUDGLJPRISUDJPDWLVP WKH&RXUW¶VEHOLHI WKDW LW
might meaningfully cabin police discretion by permitting stops and frisks upon²
and only upon²D³UHDVRQDEOH´GHJUHHRIVXVSLFLRQDFWXDOO\UHIOHFWV formalism at 
its deepest level: a belief that meaningful distinctions can be drawn between 
OHJDOO\ GHILQHG FDWHJRULHV RI ³VWRSV´ DQG ³DUUHVWV´ RU EHWZHHQ ³UHDVRQDEOH
VXVSLFLRQ´ DQG ³SUREDEOH FDXVH´  ,W LV IRUPDOLVm in this sense that animates all 
criminal procedure scholars (myself included) whose work probes and tinkers at 
the edges of constitutional doctrine, with the belief that the shape of those edges 
matters to the criminal justice system.  But Natapoff wants to push the Court, and 
even more so the rest of us, out of that formalist comfort zone by urging clear-eyed 
examination of how the bulk of work churns through our criminal justice system: 
misdemeanor processing.  Natapoff, a leading scholar of misdemeanors,65 takes us 
into the actual workings of misdemeanor justice where, she details, the lines 
between stop and arrest, between arrest and charge, and between charge and 
conviction are rarely demarcated through litigation and contestation over formal 
doctrines like Terry¶VUHDVRQDEOHVXVSLFLRQVWDQGDUG5DWKHUWDNLQJDFXHIURPWKH
late Bill Stuntz,66 Natapoff argues that the contestation is driven by the unique 
³SDWKRORJLFDOSROLWLFV´RIPLVGHPHDQRUV²D³PHVV\´LQWHUSOD\EHWZHHQZHDNOHJDO

63 Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 12-
9490).
64 Alexandra Natapoff, A Stop is Just a Stop: Terry’s Formalism, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 113 
(2017).
65 See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 255 (2015); 
Natapoff, supra note 46; Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012).
66 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510 
(2001).
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constraints and hydraulic institutional forces driving police, prosecutors, defenders, 
and judges.
1DWDSRII¶V SUDJPDWLF FDOO WR H[DPLQH WKH IDFWV RQ WKH JURXQG RI WKH
misdemeanor justice system does not suggest that Terry and the legal standard it 
enunciated is irrelevant.  RDWKHUPRUHGDPQLQJ1DWDSRII¶VFRQFOXVLRQLVWKDWTerry 
both failed to anticipate and substantially exacerbated the degree to which a mere 
police stop would have far-reaching and little scrutinized consequences for the 
civilians involved.  Natapoff bemoansWRVRPHH[WHQWWKH&RXUW¶VIDLOXUHLQTerry 
to be more prescient²a failure borne in part of its typical rejection of a more 
empirically grounded or functional jurisprudence.  What if, Natapoff imagines, 
Justice Warren had paused to play out the process that Terry stops would put in 
motion in misdemeanor cases?  Indeed, as Natapoff points out, it took only four 
years for Justice Marshall to regret his vote with the Terry majority, and to observe 
his dissent in Adams v. Williams WKDW³WKHGHOLFDWHEDODQFH that Terry struck was 
VLPSO\WRRGHOLFDWHWRRVXVFHSWLEOHWRWKHµK\GUDXOLFSUHVVXUHV¶ RIWKHGD\´67 But 
it is not the Court alone that draws methodological ire.  Natapoff concludes with an 
anti-formalist call to scholars seeking better to understand and critique the criminal 
justice system, to break out of cabined fields of inquiry that pretend that stages and 
actors in the criminal justice system can be neatly boxed in their roles and effects.  
If we are to understand the workings of the misdemeanor justice system²and,
indeed, if we are to properly understand Terry¶VOHJDF\²we as scholars must also 
de-center doctrinal line-drawing of the sort that Terry engaged in, and work in the 
³PHVV\´PXFNRIIRUPDOODZDQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOG\QDPLFVWKDWDFWXDOO\FKDUDFterizes 
much of our criminal justice system.
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67 407 U.S. 143, 161±62 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
